为了简单起见，文章省略了分析结果，比较了OEM在一些情况下的利润。在这些情况下，当OEM收取中等的授权费用时，授权再制造将成为最优的。从下图可以看出，当客户对再制造产品有较高的愿意度时，OEM进行再制造是一种最优策略，同时可以以较低的成本进行再制造，当授权费用为中等时，授权再制造仍然可以成为OEM的最佳选择。最后对于下图图所使用的条件，我们发现帕累托改进区域不存在，未经授权和授权的再制造永远不会成为OEM的最优。
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第六节
论文第六节内容主要是拓展模型，为OEM内部的再制造提供了条件，在现实生活中，我们已经看到一些OEM也有再制造部门，他们可以同时销售新产品和再制造产品，所以，文章认为OEM拥有再制造是原始模式的延伸。为了简单起见，文章省略了分析结果，比较了OEM在一些情况下的利润。
The sixth section of the paper is mainly to expand the model, which provides conditions for remanufacturing within OEMs. In real life, we have seen that some OEMs also have remanufacturing departments, and they can sell new products and remanufactured products at the same time. Therefore, the article Think of OEM-owned remanufacturing as an extension of the original model. For the sake of simplicity, the article omits the analysis results and compares the profit of OEMs in some cases.
命题5：当客户对再制造产品的愿意度和再制造业务的相对成本节约度都较高或较低时，代工企业采用非授权再制造策略最优;当客户对再制造产品的意愿较高时，再制造企业的相对成本节约较低或反之，则OEM拥有再制造企业是最优策略。在这些情况下，当OEM收取中等的授权费用时，授权再制造将成为最优的。
Proposition 5: When the willingness of customers to remanufactured products and the relative cost savings of remanufacturing business are high or low, it is optimal for OEMs to adopt the strategy of unauthorized remanufacturing; When it is high, the relative cost savings of the remanufacturing company is low or vice versa, then the OEM owning the remanufacturing company is the optimal strategy. In these cases, licensed remanufacturing will be optimal when the OEM charges moderate licensing fees.
下图中用四组参数说明了命题5的结果，为了保持一致性，使用与前一节相同的四组参数。下图 (a)和(d)显示了当顾客对再制造产品的意愿与再制造业务的相对成本节约度同时高或低时，非授权再制造是OEM的最优策略，而当OEM收取中等的授权费用时，授权IR进行再制造活动则是最优策略。从下图 (c)可以看出，当客户对再制造产品有较高的愿意度时，OEM进行再制造是一种最优策略，同时可以以较低的成本进行再制造，当授权费用为中等时，授权再制造仍然可以成为OEM的最佳选择。从下图(b)可以看出，当客户对再制造产品的愿意度较低，且再制造企业必须以较高的成本运营时，代工实施再制造始终是最优策略。最后对于下图图 (b)所使用的条件，我们发现帕累托改进区域不存在，未经授权和授权的再制造永远不会成为OEM的最优。因此，这些分析结果还对企业生产管理提供了一些见解。
The following figure illustrates the results of Proposition 5 with four sets of parameters, the same four sets of parameters as in the previous section are used for consistency. Figure (a) and (d) show that when the willingness of customers to remanufacture products and the relative cost savings of the remanufacturing business are both high or low, unauthorized remanufacturing is the optimal strategy of the OEM, and when the OEM charges moderate When the licensing fee is 100%, licensing IR to carry out remanufacturing activities is the optimal strategy. It can be seen from Figure (c) that when customers have a high willingness to remanufacture products, OEM remanufacturing is an optimal strategy, and remanufacturing can be carried out at a lower cost, when the licensing fee is At moderate, authorized remanufacturing can still be the best option for OEMs. As can be seen from Figure (b), when customers are less willing to remanufactured products, and remanufacturing companies must operate at higher costs, OEM implementation of remanufacturing is always the optimal strategy. Finally for the conditions used in Figure (b), we find that the Pareto improvement region does not exist and unauthorized and authorized remanufacturing will never be optimal for the OEM. Therefore, these analysis results also provide some insights into enterprise production management.
第七节
结合期刊论文研究意义的写法，阅读并分析了第七节本研究的管理意义内容写作。第一段首先概述了该研究得到的主要结论，通过考虑新产品、授权再制造产品和未授权再制造产品之间的竞争，考察了OEM和AR之间的纳什议价博弈中授权费用的设置；让我们了解到研究的重要性和新颖性。第二段从废旧产品再制造质量选择方面，提供了一些管理启示。此外，第三段以文本研究结果为OEM再制造授权决策提供了管理指导，强调本研究在管理层面所做出的贡献；并且，列举苹果和戴尔两个企业说明其根据自身情况的不同，所选择的再制造决策也不同。
Combined with the writing method of the research significance of journal papers, the author reads and analyzes the management significance content writing of this research in Section VII. The first paragraph begins by outlining the main conclusions of the study: examining the setting of licensing fees in the Nash bargaining game between OEMs and ARs by considering competition among new products, licensed remanufactured products, and unauthorized remanufactured products; Let us understand the importance and novelty of the research. The second paragraph provides some management inspirations from the quality selection of remanufacturing waste products. In addition, the third paragraph provides management guidance for OEM remanufacturing authorization decision-making with textual research results, emphasizing the contribution of this research at the management level; The choice of remanufacturing decisions is also different.
第八节
结合期刊论文结论Conclusion的写法，阅读并分析了第八节本研究的结论内容写作。该部分首先重述了研究问题，强调本研究问题的主题；其次，总结论文，重新提起研究问题后，文章就进一步对论文正文内容进行了总结，比如论文开发了一个两阶段博弈来得出双方的生产数量和UR的产品质量决策，设计三个代表OEM和AR之间不同议价能力关系的案例来考察合作结果，以及将模型扩展到OEM拥有再制造业务的情况，验证再制造授权策略的稳健性，这些都是重述论文的内容；最后，在总结了研究的主要论点和发现后，文章假设供应链成员知道供应链参与者行为的全部信息，从而提出了未来研究的方向：OEM、AR和UR之间的信息不对称。
Combined with the writing method of the conclusion of the journal paper, I read and analyzed the writing of the conclusion content of the eighth section of this study. This part first reiterates the research question, emphasizing the theme of this research question; secondly, summarizes the paper, and after re-introducing the research question, the paper further summarizes the content of the main body of the paper, for example, the paper develops a two-stage game to get the two-way game. Production quantity and UR's product quality decisions, design three cases representing different bargaining power relationships between OEM and AR to examine the cooperation results, and extend the model to the case where the OEM has a remanufacturing business to verify the robustness of the remanufacturing authorization strategy , which restate the content of the paper; finally, after summarizing the main arguments and findings of the study, the article assumes that supply chain members know full information about the behavior of supply chain participants, thus proposing future research directions: OEM, AR and Information asymmetry between URs.
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参考资料：谷歌翻译
参考文献：Zhou Qin and Meng Chao and Yuen Kum Fai. Remanufacturing authorization strategy for competition among OEM, authorized remanufacturer, and unauthorized remanufacturer[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2021, 242
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